It had to happen that ABN AMRO be acquired or broken up or both. After languishing in the doldrums for years under the lacklustre leadership of Rijkman Groenink, ’something’ had to happen. Groenink is a nice guy, a bit ‘mean-spirited’ at times but intelligent and personable but he is a recidivist under-performer in the top job as CEO of the Bank. He hails from the AMRO side of the bank and while the ABN Bank management were considered ‘gentlemen’ the AMRO guys were often thought of as street fighters. It is from this culture that perhaps Groenink brings to bear along with his Calvinistic values that drives the bank and of course there is the dour obdurate nature of the Dutch people themselves that is going against him.
When appointed following Jan Kalaff as CEO, Groenink knew he had to “do something” to make his mark and he did do some things but mostly he made mistakes and under performed resulting in a steady growth in profits (mostly by selling assets/business units inside) and an acceptable dividend yield but the lack of strategy is reflected in the lack of upward movement in the share price during his tenure. ABN AMRO Bank “could have been” another HSBC with the right leadership but instead it has lead to this….
That ABN AMRO would seek to team up with the Brits is logical because the Anglo-Dutch alliance has worked in the past elsewhere and no one else in Europe would do. When Groenink dismantled the protection mechanisms in place (long ago mostly to ward off the Japanese during the 1980’s) it was clear he wanted to be, and to be seen to be more ‘market driven’. He embraced the American style of management including the strategy of American outside consultants embracing a “managing for growth” mantra; as did incidently Barclays. The stouch with the Italians over Antonveneta was uncharacteristically ABN AMRO as they had always (up to then at least…) embraced a warm and fuzzy acquisition strategy rather than the cold and prickly kind.
Groenink and Varley had been talking on and off for some years. The problem is when Barclays was down and available for a good price ABN didn’t move promptly and decisively. Now that ABN is down he is much more conciliatory and of course NOW something “must happen” and this puts Barclays in the driving seat. It had long been mooted that RBS was always a contender to buy ABN (and break them up). There is the familiar re-joiner by Groenink when speculated on that “the only Scots [sic] in this place is in the bar!” Sir Fred knew what he wanted and it wasn’t the whole of ABN AMRO only bits and pieces of it and certainly NOT the domestic Dutch network which continues to languish with an unacceptable efficiency ratio dragging down the whole bank (but not exclusively; there are other non performing parts of the bank too). Sir Fred naturally wants LaSalle in the US mid west which will fit nicely into existing operations and in true Jack Welch style all the cutting and integration and blood-letting will ensure RBS US operations will be a sound move after a year or so. The rest? Well Brazil maybe, Italy; yes definitely, India YES please, China; Yes, Pakistan; Yes especially now following the latest acquisition closed by ABN only days ago and some parts of the rest of Asia; HK, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia but the rest is pretty ho hum.
Barclays is a good fit for ABN AMRO because if completed gives the best survival to ABN as a brand name, presence globally and around the world and of course could save SOME of the management. The problem with the Barclays takeover of ABN AMRO is there is not enough Jack Welsh style blood to let. The best acquisitions are the kind where you can add together the revenue streams and halve the costs (at least) of the acquired unit and the efficiency ratio jumps (down) nicely thank you vey much. This is what Sir Fred has in mind in the LaSalle case at least. For the rest of the combined Barclays and ABN AMRO there is very little overlap so that same degree of efficiency is lacking. If it goes ahead; it may well be that ABN AMRO drags down the overall performance of the combined Barclays ABN unit to the level of the ABN AMRO performance which would be a disaster for Barclays and for Varley. Unless he takes some serious steps to “cut severely” the ABN AMRO he acquires it will continue to under perform; in that case Varley is toast within a short time.
Barclays will be reluctant to “over pay” for ABN AMRO Bank and if they fail to walk the tight balance on price then at the very least one can expect Sir Fred and his pals from Santander to come in, buy ABN AMRO carve up the bits they want and sell off the rest. “The rest” I believe will include the domestic Dutch business unit that the customers in The Netherlands know as ABN AMRO Bank N.V. If it were me advising Barclays and Sir Fred, it would be near the top of the “to do” list to carve off the 650 branches comprising the domestic Dutch network into a separate unit and either sell it outright or float it on the stock exchange again within about two years maximum. This would at least give De Nederlandsche Bank something to supervise and ABN AMRO Bank can still be a player in the domestic Dutch market and be a competitor for Rabo and ING Bank and others so to that extent the domestic market is NOT losing a competitor but it will be a much smaller competitor.
I can predict that Barclays WILL make an offer to acquire ABN AMRO. I can also predict that the price they offer will be too little to appease the institutional shareholders who have finally brought this to a head. After some indecisiveness RBS and Banc Santander will enter with an offer; but the Scots being Scots will not offer MUCH more but enough to whet the appetite of the likes of the fund mangers and then more will be expected from Barclays to sweeten the pie. Groenink meanwhile knows already that he is lost personally and will plan NO PART in the future of the bank but he is pushing hard for Barclays because he knows with the alternative(s) that the Bank for the most part will cease to exist and the history to 1824 will be gone forever. A deal with Barclays means some preservation of the ABN AMRO Bank network and management and staff; a deal with the Scots and Spanish will result in the demise of the Bank as he knows it. The relationship between RBS and Santander goes back some ways to RBS’ acquisition of Nat West under hostile conditions and Sir Fred won’t walk away just because there is a staouch involved. RBS and Santander will if successful pay MORE and carve up the remains to spread far and wide.
In the event that Barclays pays MORE to the satisfaction of the institutional shareholders and wins the day then it is not “over” but just beginning and it will really focus the spotlight on Varley and what he can do with the behemoth to clean it up, trim it down and get the numbers in order within a reasonable period of time. The Dutch won’t like this at all because their Calvinistic virtues that drive the bank embrace a cradle to grave mentality and that has to be unshackled as soon as possible with substantial loss of head count and other operating costs; TWO head offices is a NO GO! IF Varley is up to the task to integrate the two successfully and that will be a big job too it still is NOT over because there needs to be a steady rate of growth year after year and if Barclays want to continue to grow in new and expanding markets they need not look further than taking over Standard Chartered next. Look out Mervin; here we go again!
